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The Politicization of Judgment
Enforcement
Cassandra Burke Robertson ∗
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court went out of its
way to disavow any intent to bring its analysis into the realm of
civil litigation. This Article, prepared for the Frederick K. Cox
International Law Center Symposium “Presidential Power,
Foreign Affairs, & the 2012 Election,” argues that in spite of
the Court’s stated intent, there is reason to believe that the
policies animating Medellín may nonetheless bleed into
transnational civil litigation. Medellín represents a noteworthy
shift in the process of international lawmaking; it moves away
from a traditional process and de-emphasizes executive power at
the federal level. In theory, it allows greater legislative and state
participation in the international realm. For private
international law—and especially for matters of forum selection
and judgment enforcement—this participation is likely to mean
politicization. By leaving an opening for further politicization of
international law, the Court’s opinion in Medellín moves the
United States further away from being able to implement a
coherent court-access policy.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, which held
that that a decision of the International Court of Justice would not
pre-empt state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions, 1
can be read as a death-penalty case, 2 as a federalism case, 3 or as an
international human-rights case. 4 By no stretch of the imagination is
∗
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1.

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008).

2.

See Christina M. Cerna, The Right to Consular Notification as a
Human Right, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 419, 438 (2008) (noting
that the consular-notification issue arose “in the context of the frontal
attack launched by Europe and Latin America against the continued
imposition of the death penalty by the United States”).

3.

See Ted Cruz, Defending U.S. Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, and
Federalism in Medellín v. Texas, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 35
(2010) (“Medellín was a significant victory for U.S. sovereignty, for
separation of powers, and for federalism.”).

4.

See Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellín v. Texas, 31
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 227, 246 (2008) (“The enduring legacy of
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it a case about ordinary civil litigation. It seems almost incongruous,
then, that the majority opinion would go out of its way to disavow
any intent to bring its analysis into the realm of civil litigation. But
the Court does exactly that, asserting that its “holding does not call
into question the ordinary enforcement of foreign judgments or
international arbitral agreements.” 5 This very disavowal reveals an
underlying concern that the policies animating Medellín may indeed
bleed into transnational civil litigation. 6 Nor is this concern
unwarranted: although the Court is correct that Medellín does not
directly affect ordinary judgment enforcement, the Court’s opinion
increases the risk that domestic politics will influence transnational
judgment enforcement in ways that harm the nation’s foreign policy
interests, and ultimately, its economic interests as well. 7
There is no doubt that questions of court access and foreign
judgment enforcement implicate both foreign policy and economic
vitality. 8 Professor Stephen Burbank has described how the
“geopolitical ramifications of international commerce” interact with
the domestic judicial system. 9 Over the last three decades, the United
States has struggled with its role in transnational litigation. The
availability of higher damage awards, liberal discovery, and accessible
courts made United States courts an attractive destination for foreign
plaintiffs, though it has made the United States much less attractive

Medellín II may thus be the unflattering and unmoving image of
American human rights exceptionalism, reflected back at states eager to
use U.S. non-compliance with international norms as an example and
excuse for rolling back rights protection.”).
5.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519–20.

6.

See James M. Fischer, Discretion and Politics: Ruminations on the
Recent Presidential Election and the Role of Discretion in the Florida
Presidential Election Recount, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 807, 846 n.139 (2001)
(noting that “[l]ike the Shakespearean lady who ‘doth protest too
much,’” such statements may unintentionally reveal “the exactly
opposite internal reality”).

7.

See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow,
International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE
J. INT’L L. 51, 73 (2012) (“Medellín has also led lower courts to apply
the presumption against enforcement universally, apparently eliminating
the carve-out for private law treaties that persisted through the postwar
period up until Medellín.”).

8.

See Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L
LAW 629 (2012) (“Transnational judgment recognition and enforcement
law and practice are, inescapably, aspects of a country’s foreign
policy.”).

9.

See id. at 637–38 (discussing the impact of the American private bar on
U.S. policy during international negotiations).
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for foreign defendants.10 The centrality of the United States’ role in
transnational litigation is now shrinking, however, as both commerce
and commercial litigation are entering a more multipolar era.11
As parties perceive greater freedom in choosing a destination for
transnational lawsuits, the foreign policy of court access becomes ever
more important. If the United States is viewed as an uncooperative
judicial partner, nations may retaliate by enacting legislation that
either encourages litigation against U.S. companies or discourages
investment and trade by those companies—both scenarios would
harm U.S. economic interests abroad.12 Likewise, unilaterally generous
judgment enforcement policies may make it more difficult to negotiate
a multilateral judgment enforcement convention,13 but more
restrictive policies run the risk of a worldwide search for corporate
assets in a potentially more favorable forum.14
Medellín—even though it is ostensibly so far removed from civil
litigation practice—moves the domestic discourse away from a
coherent court-access policy. By requiring what amounts to a “clear
statement rule” for self-executing treaties, the Court makes it
marginally more difficult to negotiate a judgments convention, to
implement the Choice of Court convention, or to engage in other

10.

See id. at 630 (referring to the United States as “a country whose courts
have been called the light to which prospective foreign plaintiffs are
drawn like moths, and are a light that most prospective foreign
defendants would like to turn out”); see also Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 1081, 1127 (2010) (noting “the increasing recognition that the
court-access doctrine implicates U.S. foreign interests”).

11.

See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New
Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign
Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 48 (2011) (“[A]s we
move toward 2021, transnational litigation will be increasingly
multipolar.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party
Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159,
173 (2011) (“[T]here may well be a global diffusion of transnational
cases, with courts in a much larger number of countries regularly
hearing cases involving foreign parties.”).

12.

See Robertson, supra note 10, at 1111 (noting that “such a state will
instead enact a more targeted blocking statute, or perhaps allow U.S.level damages in cases dismissed from U.S. courts”).

13.

See Burbank, supra note 8, at 633 (discussing how unilateralism
hindered international cooperation).

14.

Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1444, 1464 (2011) (“[I]n order to obtain an effective remedy, a
plaintiff must rely on enforcement by a court that does have jurisdiction
over assets of the defendant.”).

437

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
The Politicization of Judgment Enforcement

private international law negotiations. 15 Congress could, of course,
pass the necessary enabling legislation. However, there are
institutional competence factors that make Congress’s participation in
the area less likely to occur: Congress lacks both the specialized
knowledge and the political will to focus on the details of litigation
procedure. 16
The larger impact of Medellín, however, may be how its role in
domestic politics influences transnational lawmaking more broadly.
The majority’s opinion recognizes that states can exert power even in
areas that directly affect foreign policy. As Professor Ronald Brand
has pointed out, because the opinion “hold[s] that state procedural
rules could prevent the application of the binding international-law
rules created by these treaties,” it may therefore “constitute an
extraordinary delegation of authority to the states for matters of
foreign affairs.” 17 Although there may be some benefit to state-level
competition in judgment enforcement, 18 there are also significant
transaction costs in dealing with fifty different state policies; these
transaction costs may well outweigh any gains from competition and
experimentation. 19
15.

See Burbank, supra note 8, at 641 (stating that although the “Hague
Service and Evidence Conventions were ratified as self-executing
treaties,” Medellín makes it less likely that future conventions will follow
suit, as the self-executing treaty is now “on the cutting edge of
obsolescence in the United States”); see also Ronald A. Brand, Treaties
and the Separation of Powers in the United States: A Reassessment
After Medellín v. Texas, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 727 (2009) (“This result
is particularly likely in the areas of private international law and
international private law, areas in which the United States is
consistently involved in the negotiation of treaties and other
international legal instruments at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, UNCITRAL, and UNIDROIT.”).

16.

See James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders:
Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 493, 535 (2011) (“Interest groups may press for public
expenditures, such as the repair of roads and bridges, but they are
unlikely to press for jurisdictional repairs. The combined absence of
interest group support and, dare I say it, intrinsic interest, can
sometimes consign jurisdictional reform to legislative limbo.”).

17.

Brand, supra note 15, at 726–27.

18.

See Gregory Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional
Competition and the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments, 54
HARV. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2013), at 75–76 (“[T]he diversity of state
recognition law, which has persisted despite the availability of judgment
arbitrage, suggests that declaring a uniform national rule would cut off
an experiment in the 50 state laboratories before it may have run its
course.”).

19.

See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge
for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International
Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 637 (2000) (“[A]
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Making it more difficult to enter into international conventions on
forum choice and judgment enforcement increases the chance that a
more troubling aspect of domestic politics will come into play. At the
current time, the domestic political landscape includes a significant
xenophobic strain. 20 As a result, state-level foreign policy choices are
subject to political second-guessing.
It is true that states may individually offer deference to
international obligations; others have pointed out that “in the wake of
some decisions by the [International Court of Justice] prior to the
Avena/Medellín litigation, some governors commuted death sentences
of individuals, perhaps in response to some of the pressure coming
from these international tribunals.” 21 However, it is likely no
coincidence that the state which offered the greatest deference to the
Avena decision—Oklahoma—is also the state where the voters
adopted a constitutional amendment purporting to bar the use of
international law altogether. 22 As of 2012, the measure has been
enjoined by federal courts and has not yet become effective. 23 But as a
reflection of state politics, the Oklahoma amendment raises significant
concerns about state-level participation in foreign policy, court access,
and transnational litigation, especially since over seventy percent of
Oklahoma’s electorate voted in favor of the provision. 24 Thus, even if
the executive and judicial branches of the state are inclined to offer
deference to international law—and they were in Oklahoma—there is
no guarantee that a populist movement will not choose a different
direction. Moreover, it is not clear that such state-by-state
involvement is even necessary to protect state interests; as Professor
uniform federal standard for those jurisdictional grounds that will be
recognized for enforcement purposes would promote certainty and
predictability.”).
20.

See Burbank, supra note 8, at 632 (“[H]aving poked its head out of
international law and private international law cocoons on the field of
civil litigation, the United States appears to be regressing to a posture of
isolationism and xenophobia that is reminiscent of the second half of the
nineteenth century.”).

21.

Peter B. Rutledge, Medellín, Delegation and Conflicts (of Law), 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 191, 225 (2009).

22.

See Cerna, supra note 2, at 459 (noting that the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals reconsidered a death-penalty case in “a decision that
would not have been possible but for the decision of the ICJ in Avena,”
and that the Oklahoma governor ultimately commuted the death
sentence); Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla.
2010).

23.

Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012).

24.

Tenth Circuit Upholds Injunction Barring Oklahoma Anti-Sharia, AntiInternational Law Constitutional Amendment, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 365,
366 (2012).
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John Quigley has pointed out, the ordinary treaty making process
already integrates state concerns through the states’ representation in
the Senate, thereby integrating state input without the risk of capture
by xenophobic interests. 25
Of course, xenophobia is not going to prevail in every state.
Nevertheless, overcoming such attitudes requires expending additional
political capital—political capital that is in short supply in an
increasingly partisan and polarized country. 26 Voters in such states
may be focused on the more immediately salient questions of deathpenalty policy or anti-terrorism initiatives; they are not likely to be
thinking about transnational commercial litigation. Nevertheless, as
Justice Breyer pointed out, state power in this area will have farreaching effects in matters of foreign relations by “plac[ing] the fate of
an international promise made by the United States in the hands of a
single State.” 27 As a result, there is a significant risk that voters
focused on crime and terrorism end up with a disproportionate
influence in “the bread-and-butter commercial and other matters that
are the typical subjects of self-executing treaty provisions.” 28
There is also a significant risk such partisan political distinctions
will create enduring rifts. As international law becomes a more salient
issue at the state level, loosely held xenophobic attitudes may solidify
into an integral part of the way in which political movements selfidentify. 29 And in fact, Medellín has become something of a political
rallying cry for those who identify with the Tea Party, whose
“supporters perceive that foreign forces are succeeding in taking over
the United States, transforming the country they love into an
unrecognizable and alien land” and whose “[r]hetoric of foreign

25.

John B. Quigley, A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of
Treaties: Medellín v. Texas and Beyond, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
403 (2012).

26.

See Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA TODAY,
Dec. 9, 2010, at 3A. (“[L]egislators in at least seven states, including
Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Utah, have proposed similar laws . . . . Tennessee and Louisiana have
enacted versions of the law banning use of foreign law under certain
circumstances.”).

27.

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 554 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

28.

Id. at 554; but see Mark L. Movsesian, International Commercial
Arbitration and International Courts, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 423,
444 (2008) (noting that international arbitration is typically less
controversial in part because of its focus on commercial matters).

29.

See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos:
Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 399 (2009) (describing how support for
torture became associated with partisan identification).
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invasion and foreign infiltration dominates [its] speeches and
literature.” 30
Even an international convention focused on litigation procedure
can be re-framed as a partisan political issue. The Hague Convention
on Choice of Courts Agreement, for example, “obligates the judicial
branch of signatory nations generally to suspend litigation in favor of
the country specified in a choice of courts clause and generally to
enforce judgments rendered by that country,” and therefore would
“bind a sovereign actor in some manner determined by reference to a
rule or act of another entity not within the direct reach of the
sovereign.” 31 Finding the political will to ratify the convention might
be easier said than done in the current political climate. 32
The development of international law is interactive, not static.33
Medellín represents a noteworthy shift in the process of international
lawmaking; it moves away from a traditional process and deemphasizes executive power at the federal level. In theory it allows
greater legislative and state participation in the international realm.
For private international law—and especially for matters of forum
selection and judgment enforcement—this participation is likely to
mean politicization. By leaving an opening for further politicization of
international law, the Court’s opinion in Medellín moves the United
States further away from being able to implement a coherent courtaccess policy.

30.

Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea
Party Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (2011).

31.

Rutledge, supra note 21, at 197 (citing Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements art. 8, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294).

32.

See id. at 197; Burbank, supra note 8, at 639–41.

33.

Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellín Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617,
630 (2008) (referring to international law as “an interactive process”).
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